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The Promise of the Rule of 
(Environmental) Law: A Reply to Pardy’s 
Unbearable Licence
JOCELYN STACEY*
This short reply clarifies and defends the argument presented in “The Environmental 
Emergency and the Legality of Discretion in Environmental Law.” It responds to the arguments 
that were made, and that could have been made, in Pardy’s critique “An Unbearable Licence.” 
The reply further develops the public-justification conception of the rule of law, arguing that 
it is at home within Canadian public law. It also argues that this conception of the rule of law 
highlights possibilities for future research directions in Canadian environmental law. 
Cette courte réponse clarifie et défend l’argumentaire présenté dans l’article « L’urgence 
environnementale et la légitimité de la discrétion dans le droit environnemental ». Elle répond 
aux arguments qui ont été présentés ou qui auraient pu l’être, dans la critique de Pardy 
« Une license e insoutenable ». La réponse élabore la justification publique de la conception 
de l’état de droit en démontrant son appartenance au droit public Canadien. De plus, cette 
réponse démontre aussi que cette conception de l’État de droit soulève de nouvelles pistes 
de recherches en droit environnemental Canadien.
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“THE ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCY”1 ARGUES that environmental issues 
confront lawmakers as an ongoing emergency. The complexity of environmental 
issues and the possibility of catastrophe mean that it is not always possible for 
lawmakers to foresee an environmental catastrophe or to know in advance how 
to appropriately respond. The implication of the environmental emergency 
perspective is that administrative discretion is unavoidable in environmental law. 
“The Environmental Emergency” argues that a public-justification conception 
of the rule of law is capable of providing legal constraints on the exercise of this 
discretion because it requires that all government decisions be publicly justified 
on the basis of core common law principles. 
Those subscribing to a libertarian position are likely to object to the 
argument advanced in “The Environmental Emergency.” Libertarian and 
classical liberal positions rest on a formal conception of the rule of law, a theory 
of limited government, and a strong emphasis on private property rights.2 As 
such, libertarians are opposed to the delegation of extensive discretion to the 
executive branch of the state. For example, Richard Epstein writes, “[T]he 
cumulative demands of the modern social democratic state require a range of 
administrative compromises and shortcuts that will eventually gut the rule of law 
in practice, even if the state honors it in theory.”3 In Epstein’s view, the ambitions 
of “the modern social democratic state,” which include environmental protection 
and land use management, inevitably succumb to, amongst other things, biased 
decision making, retroactive laws, and misplaced judicial attention as government 
attempts to respond to mounting social challenges.4 The libertarian position 
poses a serious, though not insurmountable, challenge to the public-justification 
1. Jocelyn Stacey, “The Environmental Emergency and the Legality of Discretion 
in Environmental Law” (2015) 52:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 985 [Stacey, “The 
Environmental Emergency”].
2. See e.g. Eric Mack, “Libertarianism” in George Klosko, ed, The Oxford Handbook of the 
History of Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 673; Friedrick A 
Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960) at 140-3; 
Richard A Epstein, Design for Liberty: Private Property, Public Administration, and the Rule 
of Law (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011) [Epstein, Design for Liberty]. 
Libertarians argue that environmental protection can be assured by vindicating private rights 
through common law property, contract and tort actions. See Richard A Epstein, Simple 
Rules for a Complex World (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1995); Bruce Pardy, 
“In Search of the Holy Grail of Environmental Law: A Rule to Solve the Problem” (2005) 
1:1 JSDLP 29 [Pardy, “Holy Grail”].
3. Epstein, Design for Liberty, supra note 3 at 12.
4. Ibid, chs 11-13.
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conception of the rule of law that I introduce and defend in “The Environmental 
Emergency.” This reply takes the libertarian critique seriously. 
As a libertarian,5 Bruce Pardy could have mounted this kind of challenge in 
his response to “The Environmental Emergency.” Unfortunately, his critique is 
a missed opportunity for serious academic exchange. Indeed, Pardy’s response 
impedes such an exchange through a gross mischaracterization of my argument. 
For example, I am said to argue “that the state of the natural world is incompatible 
with the rule of law.”6 I am accused of arguing for the nonsensical view that 
“unconstrained executive discretion is legitimate because it is constrained.”7 In 
his view, I have both “lost the will to abstract”8 and “wildly extrapolate [from 
the challenges posed by the ambiguity of language] to abandon the enterprise 
of expressing rules and reasons that limit the power of those who govern.”9 He 
calls my argument “a cop-out”10 and “a process of doublethink that would make 
George Orwell spin in his grave.”11 In his view, my position is akin to that of 
“Henry VIII,”12 leading to the comment, “Off with her head.”13 He finds my 
argument “almost amusing.”14
The substance and tone of Pardy’s critique are surprising because Pardy was 
a double-blind reviewer for the original article. He had the opportunity to raise 
his concerns in this capacity but declined to do so. Instead, he aired them in 
his response that was published alongside my article. I am glad now to have the 
opportunity to reply.
This reply seeks to contribute constructively to a conversation about the 
meaning and purpose of the rule of law in the environmental context. It does so 
in three ways. First, this reply reclaims the environmental emergency framework 
and defends this framework against the libertarian critique. Part I argues that, 
by focusing on the administrative state, environmental libertarianism does not 
supply a theory of law that adequately accounts for the possibility of catastrophe. 
5. Bruce Pardy, Ecolawgic (Canada: Fifth Forum Press, 2015) at 75-6, online: <http://www.
ecolawgic.com> [Pardy, Ecolawgic]. Ecolawgic is a self-published monograph that is advertised 
by a website of the same name, complete with a 10-point “Manifesto.”
6. Bruce Pardy, “The Unbearable Licence of Being the Executive” (2015) 52:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 
1029 at 1036 [Pardy, “Unbearable Licence”].
7. Ibid at 1041.
8. Ibid at 1040.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid at 1042.
12. Ibid at 1035.
13. Ibid at 1044.
14. Ibid.
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Conversely, if one accepts that emergencies can be governed by a substantive 
conception of the rule of law, as Pardy seems to, then the administrative state 
can also be governed by a substantive conception of the rule of law. Part I, in 
short, reestablishes the essential connection between emergencies and everyday 
discretion and demonstrates that the environmental emergency framework does 
considerable theoretical and analytical work. 
Second, this reply examines Pardy’s and my divergent views on why the rule 
of law is something worth having in the first place. Part II contrasts the libertarian 
understanding of autonomy with the understanding of autonomy that underpins 
the public-justification conception of the rule of law. On this basis, it defends the 
public-justification conception against the charge of arbitrariness and argues that 
this conception is at home in Canadian public law. 
Third, this reply sets out future directions for an environmental research 
agenda based on the public-justification conception of the rule of law. Part III 
accomplishes this task by taking up Pardy’s objection that the existing state of 
Canadian environmental law undermines the aspirational conception of the rule 
of law that I defend. It argues that a commitment to this conception of the rule 
of law has considerable potential to secure greater environmental protection by 
requiring all public decision makers to publicly justify their decisions. It points 
to where greater attention is needed to better understand these linkages between 
rule-of-law theory and environmental law practice.
I. THE CHALLENGE POSED BY THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
EMERGENCY
This Part reclaims the environmental emergency from Pardy’s confounding 
characterization of my original argument. A central objective of “The 
Environmental Emergency” was to draw out the implicit rule-of-law assumptions 
in Canadian environmental law. It argued that conceiving of environmental issues 
as an ongoing emergency forces us to re-examine our most basic assumptions 
about law and how it governs the environment. This argument was framed using 
Schmitt’s challenge to show how emergencies can be governed by law. “The 
Environmental Emergency” argued that Schmitt’s challenge allows us to unpack 
different assumptions about the rule of law and how it can govern the emergency. 
It argued that a public-justification conception of the rule of law offers a full 
response to Schmitt’s challenge. 
The crux of “The Environmental Emergency” is that environmental issues 
constitute an ongoing emergency for the purposes of theorizing about the rule 
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of law.15 Environmental issues share the epistemic features of an emergency. We 
cannot reliably predict which environmental issues contain the possibility of a 
catastrophe or know in advance how to respond. It is not that ecosystems are in 
a perpetual state of emergency, as Pardy suggests.16 Rather, their unpredictable 
nature confronts human decision makers as an emergency when we are faced 
with an unexpected catastrophe that demands an immediate response.17 
Moreover, because some catastrophes are unknowable in advance, we cannot 
always distinguish specific environmental issues and subject them to special 
rule-of-law requirements. All environmental issues are therefore subject to 
Schmitt’s challenge. Schmitt theorized that the emergency lies outside the law.18 
Accordingly, the challenge for those committed to the ideal of subjecting all 
political action to the rule of law, is to demonstrate, contra Schmitt, how the law 
can govern the emergency.19
Pardy critiques the environmental emergency argument on two fronts. On 
the one hand, he claims that the emergency argument is irrelevant to my primary 
concern, which is the ordinary and everyday exercise of administrative discretion.20 
On the other hand, he dismisses the environmental emergency because he thinks 
it obvious that the emergency is (or can be) governed by law.21 These claims need 
to be unpacked. Indeed, it is far from clear that they are consistent.
The administrative state is a central concern of libertarians. The administrative 
state departs from the formal conception of the rule of law in significant ways. 
Administrative decision makers wield significant policy and lawmaking powers. 
Individual rights are adjudicated not by independent judges but by expert and 
partial tribunal members. From the libertarian perspective, the complexity of 
environmental issues is best addressed, not by these public institutions, but 
by individuals through free market transactions, not public institutions. As 
Epstein writes: 
15. Stacey, “The Environmental Emergency,” supra note 1 at 987.
16. Pardy, “Unbearable Licence,” supra note 6 at 1036, 1039.
17. As Pardy notes, there are multiple reasons why the state will respond to any given emergency. 
In extreme cases, it will be to protect human life. In other cases, it will be to prevent human 
suffering or prevent the loss of biodiversity or ecosystem function. In a democracy, it is likely 
to be many of these (contested) reasons all together. 
18. Carl Schmitt, Political Theology, translated by George Schwab (Cambridge, Mass: MIT 
Press, 1985) at 6.
19. Stacey, “The Environmental Emergency,” supra note 1 at 990-91.
20. Pardy, “Unbearable Licence,” supra note 6 at 1041.
21. Ibid at 1032-34.
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Repeat the same exercise of voluntary exchange and cooperation countless times, 
and achieving social welfare is a task that will take care of itself. Why? Because the 
regime of freedom of contract works well for most small-numbered transactions that 
rest on a stable distribution of property rights.22 
The current state of Canadian environmental law is far out of step with this 
conception of the rule of law. Accordingly, libertarians such as Pardy argue the 
solution is to eliminate the administrative state.23
The problem with this argument is that it does not account for the chance 
of an actual emergency. Some environmental issues contain the unforeseeable 
possibility of a catastrophe, and it is not possible to know in advance how we 
ought to respond. The purpose of using Schmitt’s challenge was to highlight 
that a commitment to governing through pre-existing legislated rules cannot 
account for the inevitable discretion that will need to be exercised in response to 
an emergency. Eliminating the administrative state does not answer the question 
of how emergency powers can be governed by law.
Pardy addresses this issue in his response. Pardy suggests that, when 
an environmental catastrophe strikes, the response to it would be governed 
by statute, perhaps the Emergencies Act, or alternatively by the Crown’s 
prerogative. Pardy writes, 
[W]hether there is a statute providing for the power or whether the Crown is 
exercising its common law prerogative in the absence of a statute, courts may 
determine whether such an emergency exists, and thus have jurisdiction to determine 
whether the power applies in particular situations and whether the Crown has acted 
within those powers.24
He moves too fast. He does not elaborate the basis of the court’s jurisdiction 
over these matters. The emergency perspective requires that we unpack the 
possible sources of authority to see which can meet Schmitt’s challenge.
Take, in the first instance, the Emergencies Act.25 The Act, as is characteristic 
of framework emergency legislation, delegates sweeping powers to the executive 
to act in times of crisis. Nonetheless, as Pardy rightly notes, the courts possess 
an interpretive and enforcement power that, when exercised, ensures that the 
executive stays within the boundaries set out by the statute. In other words, the 
courts maintain legislative supremacy by ensuring that the executive does not act 
as a law unto itself. However, the statute does not provide many bases on which the 
22. Epstein, Design for Liberty, supra note 2 at 32.
23. Pardy, “Unbearable Licence,” supra note 6 at 1047.
24. Ibid at 1032.
25. RSC 1985, c 22 (4th Supp).
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courts might intervene. The statutory language permits the Governor in Council 
to declare an emergency when it “believes, on reasonable grounds,” that an 
emergency exists.26 It further permits the Governor in Council to take emergency 
action that it “believes, on reasonable grounds, is necessary.”27 So long as the 
Governor in Council offers some reasons to support its belief that the measures 
were necessary, any reasons are sufficient to formally comply with the statute. As I 
documented in the environmental context,28 and as David Dyzenhaus and others 
have documented in the national security context,29 judges who understand their 
role in purely formal terms consistently capitulate to executive pressure. They will 
not probe the executive’s reasons for its decision and therefore do not effectively 
constrain the exercise of executive discretion.
This conception of the rule of law—the formal conception—fails Schmitt’s 
challenge. It fails because it turns the rule of law into a façade, or a thinly veiled 
cover, for executive discretion.30 The unpredictable and extreme nature of 
emergency precludes specific legislated rules and requires the exercise of discretion. 
Because legislation fails to dictate a response, the courts’ role, on this view, is only 
to ensure that the executive formally complies with the letter of the statute. Pardy 
agrees with me that a rule-of-law façade, or the creation of legal grey holes, is 
a problem.31 But he does not articulate a clear basis on which the courts ought 
to intervene. He emphasizes the role of precedent in judicial reasoning.32 Yet a 
commitment to precedent, when that precedent fails to meaningfully constrain 
executive discretion, leaves the rule of law hollow.
More promising is Pardy’s suggestion that the common law has the potential 
to constrain the exercise of discretionary powers.33 Unfortunately, Pardy does not 
elaborate how the common law does or ought to govern the exercise of emergency 
26. Ibid, ss 6, 17, 28, 38.
27. Ibid, ss 8, 19, 30, 40.
28. Stacey, “The Environmental Emergency,” supra note 1 at Part II.B.
29. See David Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006) [Dyzenhaus, Constitution of Law]; Jonathan Masur, 
“A Hard Look or a Blind Eye: Administrative Law and Military Deference” (2005) 56:3 
Hastings LJ 441.
30. It also fails because it does not explain how there is any legal constraint on the decision to 
suspend legal order (i.e., the decision to ignore the Emergencies Act). 
31. Pardy, “Unbearable Licence,” supra note 6 at 1046.
32. Ibid at 1040, 1043.
33. Note, however, that Canadian judicial review of prerogative powers is far more nuanced than 
Pardy lets on with his reference to the Case of Proclamations. See e.g. Black v Chrétien et al, 
[2001] OJ No 1853, 54 OR (3d) 215 (Ont CA); Lorne Sossin, The Boundaries of Judicial 
Review: The Law of Justiciability in Canada, 2nd ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2012). 
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powers (other than to follow precedent). He leaves us wondering why judges, 
not a democratically elected legislature or an expert executive, ought to have 
the last word on what constitutes an emergency or an appropriate emergency 
response. Common law constitutionalism—the rule-of-law theory that I 
endorse and explicate in the second half of “The Environmental Emergency”—
supplies this answer.
Common law constitutionalism posits that “the rule of law is a rule of 
fundamental constitutional principles that protect individuals from arbitrary 
action by the state.”34 The common law is a source of these fundamental 
constitutional principles, which evolve with the community as they are tested, 
refined, and redefined over time through the process of iterative common law 
reasoning. They are constitutional principles in the sense that compliance with 
these principles is constitutive of law. What counts as law—that is, which public 
decisions have legal authority—is determined by their compliance with these 
core common law principles. Public officials are under a rule-of-law obligation to 
publicly justify their decisions, that is, to demonstrate through reason-giving that 
their decisions are consistent with fundamental constitutional principles. Two of 
these common law principles are reasonableness and fairness, and they operate to 
protect those subject to the law from arbitrary decisions. And, as its source is the 
common law, the common law constitution cannot be suspended and replaced 
by a separate emergency legal regime during a time of crisis.35 
We are now in a position to see how a substantive conception of the rule of 
law constitutes legality all the way down: from an existential climate crisis to a 
discretionary fisheries permit. Common law constitutionalism meets Schmitt’s 
challenge. It provides an answer to the question of how all exercises of political 
power—including emergency response powers—can be subject to the rule of law. 
It also provides an explanation for Pardy’s observation that prerogative powers 
can be subject to the supervision of the courts. 
34. Dyzenhaus, Constitution of Law, supra note 29 at 2. See also TRS Allan, Constitutional Justice: 
A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 2.
35. Being common law, however, it is subject to being overridden by clear and unequivocal 
statutory language. However, as compliance with core common law principles is constitutive 
of law, when a legislature chooses clearly and unequivocally to override those principles, it 
undermines its claim to legality. In other words, such a statute would be legally valid but 
would not have legal authority. Dyzenhaus analogizes this to the way in which section 33 
of the Charter operates as it overrides a finding of unconstitutionality but does not render 
an unconstitutional statute constitutional. See Dyzenhaus, Constitution of Law, supra note 
29 at 206, 211.
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Pardy misses the underlying connection between the emergency and the 
administrative state. Adapting or eliminating the modern administrative state 
does not answer the challenge posed by the emergency, the ever-present possibility 
of an environmental catastrophe. And if, as he seems to accept, the emergency 
can be governed by law, then he also has at his disposal the legal tools needed 
to subject all discretionary powers to a robust conception of the rule of law. He 
simply chooses not to use them.
II. THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE RULE OF LAW
This Part addresses the heart of my disagreement with Pardy: that is, the 
disagreement over the meaning of the rule of law and how Canadian environmental 
law can realize rule-of-law ideals. Pardy and I agree that the basic commitment 
to governance under the rule of law can ensure a measure of environmental 
protection. We also agree that, at present, Canadian environmental law is in 
dire need of reform to comply with the rule of law. We fundamentally disagree, 
however, on how the rule of law can be realized in Canadian environmental 
law. This Part responds to Pardy’s assertion that a common law constitutional 
conception of the rule of law is a license for arbitrariness. It argues that common 
law constitutionalism gives rise to a requirement of public justification. This 
requirement imposes meaningful obligations on public officials that protect the 
autonomy of those subject to the law and enable their participation in the project 
of elaborating the content of the law.
Libertarians understand autonomy as freedom from state interference.36 The 
formal conception of the rule of law serves to protect autonomy, understood in 
this way, by requiring state action to comply with the formal features of the rule 
of law: publicly announced, general, clear, prospective, and stable rules that are 
enforced consistently with the stated rule.37 These formal features prevent the 
state from treating people arbitrarily because it must act through impersonal, 
abstract, and prospective rules.38 
36. Hayek, supra note 2 at 133 ff (on freedom as the absence of coercion); Richard A Epstein, 
The Classical Liberal Constitution: The Quest for Limited Government (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 2014) at 35 (referring to “classical liberal ideal of negative liberty”), 
chs 21-22 (discussing economic freedoms); Pardy, Ecolawgic, supra note 5 at 72, 76.
37. Epstein, Design for Liberty, supra note 2 at 19 ff, relying on Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, 
revised ed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969). 
38. Hayek, supra note 2 at 153.
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Pardy gives libertarianism a distinctly ecological spin. His account is 
designed to mirror the systems dynamics of biological competition and the free 
market. He writes:
In ecosystems and markets, there is no notion of common good, equality of outcome, 
or distributive justice. … No one expropriates a squirrel’s nuts for redistribution. 
The squirrel loses his nuts only to larger squirrels who take them by force. The use of 
state coercion to redistribute resources opposes system dynamics…39 
Pardy’s aspiration for the rule of law is to create and maintain a survival-of-the-
fittest, winner-takes-all society. It is openly hostile to notions of distributive 
justice,40 dismissive of collective reasoning,41 and disconnected from any theory of 
democracy.42 Moreover, in his account, environmental protection is only assured 
when there is a sufficiently motivated and capable individual who can defend 
in court her (property) rights against “permanent” and “unnatural” ecological 
interference.43 
The public-justification conception of the rule of law introduced in “The 
Environmental Emergency” also seeks to protect individuals from arbitrariness. 
But, unlike Pardy’s argument, it builds on the republican notion of autonomy as 
non-domination, or the idea that individuals should not be subject to the arbitrary 
will of another.44 The rule of law, from this perspective, protects individuals both 
from arbitrary decisions and the threat of arbitrary decisions. The strengths of 
this conception of autonomy have been articulated and defended elsewhere and 
will not be rehearsed here.45 Non-domination is a conception of autonomy that 
gives primacy to human agency and equality. It is this notion of autonomy that 
is presupposed by the version of common law constitutionalism that I defend. 
Public decisions that are not publicly justified on the basis of core common 
law principles are arbitrary. Common law constitutionalism guards against this 
39. Pardy, Ecolawgic, supra note 5 at 75.
40. Ibid.
41. Bruce Pardy, “Environmental Assessment and Three Ways Not to Do Environmental Law” 
(2010) 21 J Envtl L & Prac 139 at 141-42.
42. Ecolawgic only references democratic accountability when critiquing other theories. See 
Pardy, Ecowlawgic, supra note 5 at 4, 82, 85, 91.
43. Ibid, ch 5 at pt C; Pardy, “Holy Grail,” supra note 2.
44. David Dyzenhaus, “Rand’s Legal Republicanism” (2010) 55:3 McGill LJ 491. For an 
elaboration of republicanism, see Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and 
Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Henry S Richardson, Democratic 
Autonomy: Public Reasoning About the Ends of Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002) at 30-35.
45. Pettit, supra note 44, ch 3.
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arbitrariness by imposing a requirement of public justification on all public 
decision makers and by requiring appropriate institutional channels (including, 
but not limited to, the courts) for challenging decisions that are perceived as 
unjustified. Decision makers must disclose reasons that justify their decisions, 
and moreover, these reasons must be consistent with core constitutional principles 
of fairness and reasonableness. When they are not reasoned in this way, courts 
and other reviewing bodies (such as appeals tribunals) have a basis on which to 
intervene. Publicly justified decisions, i.e., decisions that are fair and reasonable, 
protect the individual’s status as an autonomous and equal subject before the law. 
But the process of public justification also enables the individual to participate 
in the development of the law because it provides mechanisms through which 
individuals can contest public decisions on the basis that they do not in fact 
reflect core constitutional principles.
The public-justification conception of the rule of law is inherently 
participatory. The participation of the individual subject to the law is made internal 
to the rule of law in two respects. In the first instance, the public official must 
always have the individual’s autonomy interest in her contemplation because she 
must issue reasoned, not arbitrary, decisions.46 In the second instance, the formal 
features of the rule of law ensure that the content of the law is communicated 
in a way that can be understood, deliberated upon, and contested by the legal 
subject.47 The rule of law, in other words, ensures the legal subject knows where he 
stands in relation to the law, and can plan his life accordingly, but it also ensures 
that he is entitled to participate in the project of elaborating the content of the 
law that he is subject to. A system of law that is comprised of rules that comply 
with the formal requirements of law (general, prospective, public, etc.) respects 
the autonomy of those subject to the law. But a system of law that includes an 
administrative state with extensive discretionary powers can also comply with the 
rule of law by ensuring that when those delegated powers are implemented they 
are publicly justified. 
The public-justification conception does not “object to the concept of 
rules,”48 as Pardy asserts. Environmental rules that comply with the formal features 
associated with the rule of law fulfill the requirements of public justification; they 
respect and enable the autonomy of those subject to the law. Environmental rules 
46. Kristen Rundle, Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon L Fuller (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2012) at 2, 134; Fuller, supra note 37 at 210, 219.
47. Hoi Kong, “Election Law and Deliberative Democracy: Against Deflation” (2015) 9 J 
Parliamentary Pol L 35 at 41.
48. Pardy, “Unbearable Licence,” supra note 6 at 1039.
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are unproblematic from the perspective of either the formal or public-justification 
conception of the rule of law. But what the environmental emergency reveals is 
that any theory of law that is based solely on rules is wholly inadequate, and 
glaringly so in the face of environmental catastrophes and complex, ever-changing 
environmental issues. As “The Environmental Emergency” explained, the 
formal features that comprise the formal conception of the rule of law cannot 
meaningfully constrain a necessarily discretionary emergency response.
The public-justification conception of the rule of law goes hand-in-hand 
with theories of deliberative democracy. Deliberative democrats emphasize the 
collective democratic project of generating reasoned decisions through public 
deliberation.49 They argue that persuasion is “the most justifiable form of political 
power because it is the most consistent with respecting the autonomy of persons, 
their capacity for self-government.”50 Deliberative democrats accordingly seek to 
delineate conditions for ensuring public decisions can be guided to the extent 
possible by persuasion achieved through actual deliberation.51 Democracy, on 
this view, is more than just majority rule. It is a process of public decision making 
that strives to treat individuals as free, equal, and capable of giving and receiving 
reasons for collective action.52 The rule-of-law requirement of public justification 
thus fits comfortably within a deliberative democracy. It requires “a culture of 
justification,”53 in which public officials are expected to offer reasoned justification 
for their decisions and in which those subject to these decisions are empowered 
to challenge them when they are not justified in accordance with fundamental 
principles. All public institutions must be part of this project of justification, 
49. See Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, translated by William Rehg (Cambridge, 
Mass: MIT Press, 1996); Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative 
Democracy? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) at 3; John S Dryzek & Simon 
Niemeyer, Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative Governance (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010) at 3.
50. Amy Gutmann, “Democracy” in Robert E Goodin, Philip Pettit & Thomas Pogge, eds, 
A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007) 521 at 527. 
See also Habermas, supra note 49 at 306 (outlining what he calls the “unforced force of the 
better argument”).
51. Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 49 at 100.
52. Joshua Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy” in James Bonham & William 
Rehg, eds, Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics (Cambridge, Mass: MIT 
Press, 1997) 67 at 75.
53.  Etienne Mureinik, “A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights” (1994) 
10:1 SAJHR 31; David Dyzenhaus, “Law as Justification: Etienne Mureinik’s Conception 
of Legal Culture” (1998) 14:1 SAJHR 11. See also David Dyzenhaus, Hard Cases in Wicked 
Legal Systems (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1991) at 263-64 (outlining the connection between 
common law constitutionalism and the reason-giving legislature).
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meaning that on this view, realizing the rule of law requires a collective effort 
amongst legislators, judges, administrative decision makers, and the individuals 
that accept or contest their decisions.
A libertarian might respond, as Epstein does, that public justification, while 
nice in theory, does not work in practice. Epstein writes, “Discretion is, to many 
people, the better part of valor. But not in public affairs, where discretion leads to 
the creation of indefinite property rights that invite political maneuvering of the 
types that traditionally have marred areas of labor and land use regulation.”54 In 
other words, Epstein points out that our public institutions fail. They succumb to 
capture by powerful interests and the courts are not always capable of providing 
an effective check on their exercises of power.55
Indeed, some public institutions do fail. And some are likely to be more 
susceptible to capture than others. But these failures are not inevitable and 
“The Environmental Emergency” offers examples of institutions endeavouring 
to ensure public justification.56 To be clear: Nothing in the public-justification 
conception of the rule of law undermines a commitment to governing through 
legislated rules that comply with the formal features of the rule of law. The 
environmental emergency framework and the public-justification conception 
that follows from it are deliberately agnostic about whether we should attempt 
to address any particular environmental issue primarily through abstract, general 
rules or by delegating significant discretion to administrative decision makers (of 
any sort).57 This is not because I do not have views on the forms of regulation that 
are best suited to address individual environmental problems; I do. It is because 
these views are part of the democratic debate that is ensured by the rule of law. 
They are not internal to the rule of law itself. 
54. Epstein, Design for Liberty, supra note 2 at 191-92.
55. See also Cass R Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, “Libertarian Administrative Law” (2015) 82:1 
U Chicago L Rev 393 at 416.
56. Stacey, “The Environmental Emergency,” supra note 1 at 1024-27.
57. See also Hoi Kong, “The Deliberative City” (2010) 28:2 Windsor YB Access Just 411 
at 417-19. Even where Pardy thinks we agree, I am afraid we do not. See e.g. Pardy, 
“Unbearable Licence,” supra note 6 at 1046-47. Contrary to his response, I do not think 
that independent expert decision makers are necessarily bad. Any complex society must rely 
extensively on experts to function. “The Environmental Emergency” argued that independent 
experts cannot redeem the formal conception of the rule of law (supra note 1 at 1014-18). 
At the risk of repetition, independent expert decision making complies with the rule of 
law when it is publicly justified. Independent experts, just as any administrative decision 
maker, must offer reasons that demonstrate to those affected that their decisions are fair 
and reasonable.
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Public justification means that whenever the state comes in contact with the 
lives of individuals, it must offer reasoned justification for its decision, and that 
the decision can be challenged on the basis that it fails to show that the decision 
has legal warrant consistent with constitutional principles. This amounts to a 
license for arbitrariness only if one adheres to the libertarian’s prior belief that 
state interference with the private relations of individuals is inherently suspect. 
Public justification, in contrast, takes seriously the idea that individuals and the 
institutions in which they participate can collectively reason about decisions 
affecting the environment, while also respecting each individual’s right to be free 
from arbitrary public decisions.58 
Government decisions that are publicly justifiable may well interfere with 
the property rights of private parties. Under the libertarian’s preferred conception 
of freedom—freedom as non-interference—such decisions may arguably 
compromise the freedom of the individuals they touch. However, under the 
republican conception of freedom that underwrites the public-justification 
conception of the rule of law—freedom as non-domination—such decisions 
do not compromise freedom, precisely because their publicly justifiable nature 
entails that they are not arbitrary. Under the republican conception of freedom, 
interference compromises freedom only if it arises from a decision that is 
unjustifiable and therefore arbitrary. 
III. PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Parts I and II responded to Pardy’s confused assessment of the primary argument 
in “The Environmental Emergency.” Relying on the emergency framework, Part 
I clarified that a common law constitutional conception of the rule of law can 
respond to Schmitt’s challenge and thus provide an account of the rule of law 
capable of governing the natural environment. Part II further elaborated the 
theory behind common law constitutionalism, how it gives rise to a requirement 
of public justification, and why this is a superior conception of the rule of law to 
the one advanced elsewhere by Pardy. This Part turns to Pardy’s direct criticisms of 
the public-justification conception of the rule of law. In particular, I take up the 
role of reasons in environmental law and the potential for creative institutional 
design. These matters are ripe for future environmental law scholarship that seeks 
to expand upon the common law constitutional conception of the rule of law. 
58. See generally, Richardson, supra note 44.
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Pardy observes that many administrative decision makers do not offer reasons 
for their decisions and that when they do, these reasons may be inconsistent with 
previous decisions. In his view, current practice undermines the conception of 
the rule of law advanced in “The Environmental Emergency.” This argument is 
perplexing given that the account that I defend is aspirational in nature.59 The 
fact that administrative decision makers currently do not offer public reasons for 
their decisions does not imply they cannot. When they fail to offer public reasons 
that adequately justify their decisions, they fail to comply with the rule of law.
An interesting question is what might ‘count’ as adequate reasons in light of 
the variety of environmental decisions that are made in Canadian environmental 
law. Important decisions are often made by way of orders in council, regulation, 
or environmental permits. The reasons for the decision may therefore need to 
take an unconventional form which may further contribute to judicial reluctance 
to engage directly with the reasoning underpinning these decisions.60 While I 
cannot answer this question satisfactorily in the scope of this reply, it is important 
to note that the requirement to offer reasons need not come from the courts.61 
Indeed, in many instances the legislature has been the more proactive institution 
and has legislated a reason-giving requirement. The federal Species at Risk Act, for 
example, requires the Governor in Council to offer reasons when it declines to 
protect a species under the Act.62 In some cases, the executive might implement 
a reason-giving requirement on its own initiative, as is the case with the Cabinet 
Directive on Regulatory Management, which requires a publicly available regulatory 
impact analysis prior to proposing new regulations.63 I offer these examples not 
because they are ideal instances of reason-giving in environmental law, but rather 
because they suggest a commitment on the part of the legislature and executive, at 
59. Stacey, “The Environmental Emergency,” supra note 1 at 1020-22 (noting the ways in which 
the Supreme Court of Canada has fallen short of this conception), n 203 (explicitly stating 
that the public-justification conception is aspirational). For a nice articulation of how the 
rule of law can be understood as both practice and aspiration, see Nigel E Simmonds, Law as 
a Moral Idea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). See especially ibid at 52-54. 
60. Stacey, “The Environmental Emergency,” supra note 1 at 1012-13 (offering examples of 
judicial reluctance to engage with the reasons for environmental decisions).
61. Pardy, “Unbearable Licence,” supra note 6 at 1043, citing Baker v Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817, 174 DLR (4th) 193.
62. SC 2002, c 29, s 27(1.2). Note that, arguably, the Governor in Council does not need to give 
reasons for a listing because it has implicitly accepted the publicly-available expert assessment 
of the species (ibid, s 25). Therefore, public justification is offered in both instances.
63. Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Cabinet Directive on Regulatory Management (1 
October 2012), online: Government of Canada <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/hgw-cgf/
priorities-priorites/rtrap-parfa/guides/cdrm-dcgr-eng.asp>.
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least in some cases, to govern in accordance with a public-justification conception 
of the rule of law.
Pardy notes that even where reasons are offered, administrative decision 
makers are not subject to a requirement to adhere to precedent in the same 
manner as the courts. But it is worth asking why they are not. Part of the answer 
lies in persistence of the formal conception of the rule of law, which treats the 
administrative state as a legal “grey hole.”64 In contrast, subjecting administrative 
decisions to a robust conception of the rule of law requires a considerable increase 
in attention to the machinery of the administrative state and how individual 
decisions are made. 
A close examination of these decisions may reveal that no two environmental 
decisions are exactly alike, due to the complexity and evolving nature of 
environmental issues. Yet the public justification conception requires that each 
decision be reached in the same manner. It requires that each decision reflect 
its statutory purpose, taking into account prior adequately reasoned precedents, 
and, if necessary, justifying departure from those precedents on the basis of 
relevant considerations. When decisions are not supported by this kind of 
public reasoning—as many, if not most, environmental decisions currently are 
not—they do not comply with the rule of law. “The Environmental Emergency,” 
highlights the fact that the concepts of reasonableness and fairness require further 
elaboration in the context of environmental law.65 They will be contested and 
sometimes messy, as they are in other areas of administrative law. But the process 
of contesting and refining the requirements of reasonableness and fairness in any 
given case is precisely the aim of a democratic conception of the rule of law. 
The persistence of the formal conception in environmental law has impeded the 
development of these common law requirements in the environmental context.
Finally, Pardy takes issue with the implications of the public-justification 
conception for the separation of powers and institutional design. As should be 
clear, Pardy and I fundamentally disagree about whether we ought to strive for 
a strict separation of powers or embrace the potential for creative institutional 
design as a way of promoting individual autonomy and meaningful participation 
64. Stacey, “The Environmental Emergency,” supra note 1 at 1010-13.
65. Ibid at 1027-28. Elsewhere I have argued that they ought to be informed by 
deliberative-democratic interpretations of environmental principles. See Jocelyn Stacey, The 
Constitution of the Environmental Emergency (DCL Thesis, McGill University Faculty of Law, 
2015) [unpublished].
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in environmental governance.66 Understanding autonomy as non-domination, 
as set out in Part II, opens up the possibility for institutional experimentation 
that can further the project of public justification. Courts play a central role in 
maintaining the rule of law by requiring that other institutions publicly justify 
their decisions. But understanding the rule of law in this way allows for a better 
understanding of how diverse institutions—environmental appeals tribunals, 
auditor generals, ombudspersons, amongst others—also play an important role 
in maintaining the rule of law.67 These institutions are all “strands in a web of 
public justification,”68 which subject the full range of public environmental 
decisions to scrutiny that a generalist court on its own cannot provide. 
It is worth noting, in conclusion, that the public-justification conception of 
the rule of law has significant and immediate practical implications. The most 
obvious implication is that it provides a legitimate basis on which courts can and 
must intervene when environmental decision makers have failed to justify their 
decisions in accordance with fundamental common law principles. To offer one 
example, the recent wave of judicial decisions69 that have legitimized the National 
Energy Board’s flawed decision-making process demonstrates the need to advance 
a theory of law that requires reasoned environmental decisions that reflect core 
common law principles. More generally, it also supplies a legal framework within 
which virtually any public environmental commitment, however half-hearted, 
should be taken as evidence of a commitment to public justification and used as 
66. See also Evan Fox-Decent, “Democratizing Common Law Constitutionalism” (2010) 
55:3 McGill LJ 511 (defending a theory of common law constitutionalism in which the 
separation of powers is irrelevant). 
67. Stacey, “The Environmental Emergency,” supra note 1 at 1024-27. See also Western 
Canada Wilderness Committee v British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource 
Operations), 2014 BCSC 808, [2014] BCJ No 903. The court held that the Board was the 
appropriate forum but went ahead and decided the matter anyway, denying any distinctive 
role to the Board.
68. David Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in Michael 
Taggart, ed, The Province of Administrative Law (Oxford: Hart, 1997) 279 at 305.
69. See Sinclair v Canada (National Energy Board), 2014 FCA 245, [2014] FCJ No 1089; 
Quarmby et al v National Energy Board of Canada et al (2015) FCA 14-A-62 (refusing 
leave to appeal); Quarmby v Canada (Attorney General), [2015] SCCA No 113 (refusing 
leave to appeal); City of Vancouver v NEB and Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC (2014), FCA 
14-A-55 (refusing leave to appeal). See generally National Energy Board, “Court Challenges 
to National Energy Board or Governor in Council Decisions” (12 April 2016), online: 
Government of Canada <https://www.neb-one.gc.ca/pplctnflng/crt/index-eng.html>.
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a basis for deriving more robust legal requirements than are currently recognized 
in Canadian environmental law.70
IV. CONCLUSION
Pardy and I share three common premises about environmental law. We both 
maintain that environmental issues are properly situated within the theory 
of complex, adaptive systems. We agree that this understanding of ecological 
complexity, in turn, presents a challenge for realizing the rule of law in the 
environmental context. We also agree that it is nonetheless possible to remain 
committed to environmental governance under the rule of law. I argue that these 
three premises can be explored by understanding environmental issues as an 
ongoing emergency. Pardy disagrees. However, Pardy’s critiques miss their marks. 
The emergency perspective allows us to unpack the rule-of-law assumptions 
implicit in the deep administrative structures, if not the current practice, of 
Canadian environmental law. And, more importantly, this perspective provides a 
foundation for building a robust conception of the rule of (environmental) law, 
one that requires every public environmental decision to be justified on the basis 
of core constitutional principles.
70. I am thinking here of initiatives like the moribund Alberta Environmental Monitoring 
and Reporting Agency, which was declared a “failed experiment”. See Paul M Boothe, 
“Review of the Alberta Environmental Monitoring Evaluation and Reporting Agency,” (5 
November 2015) Alberta Environment and Parks, online: <http://aep.alberta.ca/about-us/
environmental-monitoring/documents/ReviewOfAEMERA-Report-Nov2015.pdf>. Another 
such initiative is the federal government’s Federal Sustainable Development Act, SC 2008, c33. 
This Act authorizes certain (weak) reporting and planning requirements. The exception to 
this statement is where legislation clearly and unequivocally limits or eliminates common law 
requirements of fairness and reasonableness.
